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Abstract
Recent years have seen growing interest in modifying interventionist accounts of 
causal explanation in order to characterise noncausal explanation. However, one 
surprising element of such accounts is that they have typically jettisoned the core 
feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the 
philosophy of science literature suggests that interventions exclusively demarcate 
causal relationships. This position is so prevalent that, until now, no one has even 
thought to name it. We call it “intervention puritanism”. In this paper, we mount 
the first sustained defence of the idea that there are distinctively noncausal expla-
nations which can be characterized in terms of possible interventions; and thus, 
argue that I-puritanism is false. We call the resultant position “intervention liber-
alism” (I-liberalism, for short). While many have followed Woodward (Making 
Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003) in committing to I-pluralism, we trace support for I-liberalism back to the 
work of Kim (in: Kim (ed) Supervenience and mind, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1974/1993). Furthermore, we analyse two recent sources of scepticism 
regarding I-liberalism: debate surrounding mechanistic constitution; and attempts to 
provide a monistic account of explanation. We show that neither literature provides 
compelling reasons for adopting I-puritanism. Finally, we present a novel taxonomy 
of available positions upon the role of possible interventions in explanation: weak 
causal imperialism; strong causal imperialism; monist intervention puritanism; plu-
ralist intervention puritanism; monist intervention liberalism; and finally, the spe-
cific position defended in this paper, pluralist intervention liberalism.
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Recent years have seen growing interest in the prospect of modifying interventionist 
analyses of causal explanation, popularized by James Woodward (2003), in order to 
characterize explanations which are seemingly noncausal in nature.1 One seemingly 
odd feature typically shared by such accounts, however, is that they jettison the core 
feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the dominant position within the 
philosophy of science literature suggests that, roughly speaking, where it is possible 
to intervene upon X, in such a way that changes the value of Y, X causes Y. Which is 
to say that interventions exclusively demarcate causal explanations.2
So prevalent is this position that, until now, no one has seen fit to name it. We 
call it “intervention puritanism” (I-puritanism, for short). While dissenting voices 
have begun to appear (including Woodward (2018) himself), this paper represents 
the first sustained defence of the idea that there are distinctively noncausal explana-
tions which can be characterized in terms of such interventions; in other words, that 
possible interventions do not carve nature at its causal joints.3 We call this position 
“intervention liberalism” (I-liberalism, for short).
Given the relatively recent emergence of interest in interventionism with respect 
to noncausal explanation, it might come as some surprise to discover that prece-
dence for I-liberalism can be found as far back as the 1970s.4 In a series of (largely 
overlooked) papers, Jaegwon Kim argues against causal imperialism, the view that 
all explanations track causal relations.5 In ‘Causes and Counterfactuals’ (1973) Kim 
1 While Woodward’s (2003) interventionist analysis of causation is generally taken to be ‘the standard 
philosophical account’ (Wilson, 2018:18), Woodward himself attributes the term “intervention” to Meek 
& Glymour (1994) and Pearl (2000). Also see: Hitchock (2001), Pearl (2009) and Briggs (2012).
2 See, for example: Woodward (2003, 2015, 2018; Bokulich 2011; Leuridan 2012; Saatsi and Pexton 
2013; Harinen 2014; Pexton 2014; Baumgartner & Gebharter 2015; Rice 2015; Romero 2015; Reutlinger 
2016, 2017, 2018; Baumgartner & Casini 2017; French and Saatsi 2018; Khalifa et  al., 2018, 2020; 
Saatsi 2018; Jansson & Saatsi 2019; Lange 2019).
3 There is currently ongoing debate regarding the explanatory status of impossible interventions, with 
several authors having recently argued for their application in noncausal explanations across mathemat-
ics, logic, and metaphysics (see e.g., Schaffer (2016, 2017); Wilson (2016, 2018, 2021); Baron et  al 
(2017); Baron et al (2020); Reutlinger et al (2020); Baron & Colyvan (2021); and Baron (forthcoming). 
It is widely understood that such impossible interventions require the rejection of traditional counterfac-
tual semantics (see e.g., Baron & Colyvan 2021: 564–567). For the purposes of this paper, however, the 
reader ought to assume that where we use the term “intervention”, unless explicitly stated otherwise, we 
mean “physically possible intervention”. One prima facie reason for limiting our account in this way is 
that (as we shall soon see) such cases do not require any substantial modification to be made to the typi-
cal interventionist methodology, and thus constitute the most robust form of counterexample to I-puritan-
ism. What is more, as we discuss further in Sects. 5 and 7, appealing to the role of impossible interven-
tions does not, by itself, constitute a rejection of I-puritanism.
4 In fact, I believe that something like this idea can be traced back to C. S. Peirce (1931–58), who argues 
that even pure mathematics and logic concern ‘operations on diagrams, whether external or imaginary, 
[which] take the place of the experiments upon real things that one performs in chemical or physical 
research’ (Collected Papers 4:530; 1905). Also see Peirce (Writings 3:41; 1872). While certainly worthy 
of further investigation, such a task is strictly beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Causal imperialism (a term borrowed from Bokulich [2018]) is most closely associated with Rail-
ton (1981); Lewis (1986); Strevens (2008); and Skow (2014). This position is to be distinguished from 
I-puritanism, which is neutral with respect to whether all explanations are causal explanations. As we 
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highlights cases of asymmetric counterfactual dependence which motivate the exist-
ence of distinctly noncausal explanations. In ‘Noncausal Connections’ (1974), Kim 
goes further, arguing that both causal and noncausal dependence can be character-
ized in terms of the “bringing about” relation. Where A depends upon B (causally 
or otherwise), Kim suggests, we can bring about B by first bringing about A, but not 
vice versa.6
More recently, Woodward’s (2003) manipulationist account of causal explana-
tion has given Kim’s intuitive conception of “bringing about” a formal characteriza-
tion through the notion of a possible intervention; making use of structural equation 
models to encode an asymmetric pattern of interventionist counterfactuals. In the 
first two sections of this paper, we revisit Kim’s analysis of noncausal explanatory 
dependence and attempt to reconcile his position within a contemporary interven-
tionist framework.
In Sect.  2, we outline Kim’s motivation for suggesting that noncausal counter-
factual dependence can be characterized in terms of “bringing about”. In Sect. 3 we 
introduce Woodward’s (2003) analysis of causal explanation and demonstrate how 
Kim’s analysis of noncausal explanation can be fruitfully accommodated with the 
framework of structural equations models and interventionist counterfactuals. As it 
transpires, the sort of noncausal explanatory dependence highlighted by Kim can be 
happily cashed out in terms of possible interventions.
As was mentioned at the outset, I-liberalism has been staunchly opposed within 
the recent philosophy of science literature. There are two distinct (but related) 
debates which have served as focal points of such scepticism. The first concerns a 
particular type of noncausal explanation: constitutive explanation. In response to 
Carl Craver’s (2007a, 2007b) attempts to characterise constitutive explanation in 
terms of mutual manipulability, one common counter has been that, since manipu-
lability is an essentially causal notion, Craver’s account fails as a characterisation of 
noncausal explanation.7
The second such debate concerns a slew of recent interest in providing a monistic 
account of the asymmetry of causal and noncausal explanation. Here it is once again 
widely assumed that possible interventions characterize only causal relationships 
and, as such, that they must be jettisoned when providing an account of explanation 
6 A popular position within both philosophy of science and metaphysics suggests that ‘explanations 
must depict dependence relations’ (Potochnik, 2017:105). While Kim’s analysis focuses on causal and 
noncausal dependence, following the likes of Ruben (1990); Kim (1994); Strevens (2008); Audi (2012); 
Craver (2014) Schaffer (2016); and Kovacs (2017), we shall assume that wherever one finds a depend-
ence relation of the sort in question, an explanation follows. While there remain dissenting voices (Das-
gupta 2017; Khalifa et al., 2018; Taylor 2018; Thompson 2018), the majority of those involved in debate 
surrounding noncausal explanation would at least concede something close to this position.
7 See, e.g. Craver’s (2007a; 2007b); Leuridan (2012); Harinen 2014; Romero 2015; Baumgartner & 
Gebharter 2016; Cassini & Baumgartner 2016; and Krickel 2018.
shall see, many hold that while noncausal explanations do exist, they are not characterizable in terms of 




which unifies causal and noncausal instances.8 In both debates, however, motivation 
for I-puritanism is remarkably thin on the ground, principally relying upon Wood-
ward’s (2003) own commitment to this position.
In Sect. 4, we demonstrate that I-liberalism can accurately characterise an arche-
typal case of constitutive explanation: the nastic movement of Mimosa Pudica. 
In Sect. 5 we argue that, while Woodward (2003) does appear to commit himself 
I-puritan, such an interpretation of his interventionist framework is far from obliga-
tory. What Kim’s intuition regarding the “bringing about” relations shows, is that 
causal relationships do not exhaustively describe the ways in which agents can 
manipulate the world around them.
In Sect.  6, we consider one of the few arguments against I-liberalism which 
does not rely upon Woodward’s own I-puritanism. In the process of arguing against 
explanatory monism, Kareem Khalifa et al (2020) suggest that I-liberalism is unten-
able precisely because it cannot distinguish between cases of genuine noncausal 
dependence and cases analogous to spurious correlation resulting from some com-
mon explanatory source. Conversely, we argue that, while analogous spurious corre-
lations do arise with respect to noncausal explanation, constitutive explanations are 
not among them and, what is more, that I-liberalism is perfectly capable of dealing 
with such cases.
In the final section, we provide a novel taxonomy of available positions upon the 
role of interventions in explanation. We highlight six such positions: weak causal 
imperialism; strong causal imperialism; monist intervention puritanism; plural-
ist intervention puritanism; monist intervention liberalism; and finally, the position 
defended in this paper, pluralist intervention liberalism.
2  Kim on Noncausal Connections
In ‘Causes and Counterfactuals’, Kim (1973) highlights several cases which appear 
to undermine the causal imperialist claim that counterfactuals exclusively express 
causal dependencies.9 Take the relationship between Xanthippe’s becoming a 
widow and the death of her husband, Socrates. Does Socrates’ death cause Xanthip-
pe’s widowhood? There are reasons to think not. First and foremost, these events are 
spatially “discontiguous”. As Kim highlights, to accept that such causal action could 
be ‘propagated instantaneously through spatial distance’ would be an unforgiveable 
afront to physics (1974/1993:13).10 Second, presuming that individual causal rela-
tions instantiate nomic regularities, it is difficult to think of a contingent empirical 
law capable of subsuming these events (Kim, 1974/1993:13).
8 E.g. Saatsi and Pexton (2013); Jansson (2015); Reutlinger (2016, 2017); French and Saatsi (2018); 
Lange (2019); Khalifa et al (2020).
9 Lewis (1973), being Kim’s explicit target here.
10 It is interesting to note that Woodward believes that his interventionist methodology provides reason 
for denying that spatiotemporal contiguity is a defining characteristic of causation (2003:36). Although, 
in more recent work, Woodward (2018) accepts this particular example as an instance of distinctively 
noncausal dependence.
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If Socrates’ death is not the cause of Xanthippe’s becoming a widow, then per-
haps whatever caused Socrates death was itself the cause of Xanthippe’s widow-
hood. This interpretation of the situation even seems to allow for a ‘nice Humean 
law’ which subsumes hemlock consumption and widowhood: ‘given the law, let 
us assume, that anyone who drinks hemlock dies, we have the law—at least a 
Humean regularity—that anyone whose husband drinks hemlock becomes a 
widow’ (1974/1993:30).
The problem with this interpretation is that the only route from hemlock to 
widowhood seems to go through death. If Socrates’ having ingested hemlock 
causes Xanthippe’s widowhood, it does so only by first causing his death, which 
puts us back where we started. Consequently, if neither Socrates’ drinking hem-
lock, nor any other apparent cause of his death could count as the cause of Xan-
thippe’s becoming a widow, we can only conclude, according to Kim, that Xan-
thippe’s being widowed has no cause at all.
And yet, these events are obviously connected in some sense. Indeed, notwith-
standing those features discussed above, there are some clear similarities between 
this type of noncausal connection and archetypal causal explanations. First and 
foremost, Kim argues, the sort of explanatory asymmetry which we might expect 
from a cause-and-effect relationship can be drawn out when considering the 
counterfactual conditionals related to these events:
If Socrates had not died at t, Xanthippe would not have become a widow at t.
If Xanthippe had not become a widow at t, Socrates would not have died at t.
The counterfactual dependence between these two events is ‘irreversible’; 
while (1) is straightforwardly true, in response to (2), Kim notes, ‘we would more 
likely alter the marital condition of Socrates than tamper with the fact of his death 
at t’ (1974/1993:24). This irreversibility becomes clearer when we examine a sec-
ond form of asymmetry which Kim notes with respect these events: asymmetry in 
the agency relation. Consider the following counterfactuals:
By bringing about Socrates’ death, we could bring about Xanthippe’s wid-
owhood.
By bringing about Xanthippe’s widowhood, we could bring about Socrates’ 
death.
What Kim’s intuition regarding these counterfactuals suggests, is that if we 
wished to make Xanthippe a widow, facilitating Socrates’ death would be the best 
(indeed only) way to go about doing it. On the other hand, attempting to make 
Xanthippe a widow would not be an “effective strategy” (to use a phrase of Cart-
wright’s (1979)) to bring about Socrates’ death. In much the same way, while we 
might increase the length of a pendulum to bring about an alteration in its period 
of swing, altering its period of swing would not be an effective strategy to bring 
about an increase in its length. Such events are not the result of coincidence or 
brute fact, but ‘are determined by other events; their occurrence is completely 
dependent on the occurrence of others, but this is not to say that they are causally 
determined by them’ (Kim, 1974/1993:30).
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In concluding these observations, Kim tentatively puts forward the thesis that 
both causal and noncausal connections might be characterised, monistically, in terms 
of a single unifying relation “R”: ‘a broad relation of dependency that subsumes as 
special cases the causal relation and other dependency relations’ (1974/1993:27). 
Unfortunately, Kim (1974/1993) does not provide a substantive account of what this 
relation might be.11 With the benefit of Woodward’s (2003) methodology, however, 
we believe that a more formal characterization to Kim’s intuitions regarding the 
“bringing about” relation can be given in terms of interventionist counterfactuals 
and structural equations. It is to this task that we turn in the next section.
3  An Interventionist Account of “Bringing About”
According to Woodward, any attempt to characterise causal dependence ought to 
begin by considering the practical utility of our notion of causation; what does 
causal knowledge allow us to achieve that information about mere regularity or cor-
relation, will not? (2003: 28). In answer to this question, Woodward suggests that ‘it 
is heuristically useful to think of explanatory and causal relationships as relation-
ships that are potentially exploitable for the purposes of manipulation and control’ 
(2003: 25). It is manipulability, then, that distinguishes explanatory counterfactuals 
from nonexplanatory counterfactuals (the latter of which arise as the result of mere 
correlation).12
To say that X causes Y, on this picture, is to say that Y would change in value 
under some suitable intervention that changed the value of X. Where an interven-
tion on X with respect to Y ‘changes the value of X in such a way that if any change 
occurs in Y, it occurs only as a result of the change in the value of X and not from 
any other source’ (Woodward, 2003:14). More formally, I is an intervention on X iff:
 I.  I causes X;
 II. I acts as a switch for all other variables that cause X. That is, certain values of 
I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend on the values of 
other variables that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I;
11 This is likely due, at least in part, to historical timing. While others (e.g. Collingwood 1944; Gasking 
1955; and von Wright 1975) had already argued that ‘causes are, as it were, levers for moving effects’, 
such “agential” or “manipulationist” accounts of causal explanation were thought to run into ‘intractable 
difficulties’, and were largely abandoned (Hausman, 1982:45). It should come as no surprise then, that 
Kim’s project of accounting for both causal and noncausal explanation in terms “bringing about” found 
little contemporaneous support. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, the tide had well and truly 
turned. Thanks, in no small part, to a spirited defence by Menzies and Price (1993), which updated sev-
eral crucial elements of previous agential theories (such as relinquishing a commitment to determinism), 
and convincingly circumvented many of the seemingly intractable difficulties mentioned above.
12 Where it is possible to intervene upon X with respect to Y in this way, one might alternatively say that 
X is exploitable for the purposes of manipulation Y. As such, we shall use the terms intervention and 
manipulation interchangeably in what follows. We shall discuss the sort of nonexplanatory counterfactu-
als which arise as a result of mere correlation in Sect. 6.
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 III. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not directly 
cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct from X except, of 
course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into the I → X →  → Y con-
nection itself; that is, except for (a) any causes of Y that are effects of X (i.e., 
variables that are causally between X and Y) and (b) any causes of Y that are 
between I and X and have no effect on Y independently of X;
 IV. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that is on a 
direct path that does not go through X. (Woodward, 2003:98).
As we have already seen, Kim is well aware of this agential dynamic to depend-
ence. Indeed, his analysis of the asymmetric relationship between dependent events 
comes tantalizingly close to the core claim of Woodward’s interventionism. Kim 
argues that the asymmetry of the agency relation, the sense in which ‘by bringing 
about the cause, you bring about the effect’, is a result of the asymmetry ‘between 
states or events brought about by the action’ (1974/1993:25).
While he does not use the term, it is clear that manipulation is something like the 
notion which Kim is intending to highlight with his discussion of the connection 
between agency and dependence. Indeed, the relationship between Socrates’ death 
and Xanthippe widowhood, appears to fit nicely into the sort of structural equations 
utilized by interventionists in modelling causation. Such a model consists of:
• A set of variables representing features of reality, in this case:
  C: Whether Socrates dies.
  E: Whether Xanthippe is a widow.
• A set of structural equations linking the values of these variables according to 
reality’s causal structure, where ‘ → ’ expresses counterfactual dependence:
  E → C
• And, an assignment function specifying which values the variables actually take:
  C = 1; E = 1
For C to be considered a cause of E, it must be possible to intervene upon C, 
altering its value from ‘C = 1’ to ‘C = 0’, in such a way that will result in a change 
in the value of ‘E = 1’ to ‘E = 0’. This means that it ought to be possible to inter-
vene upon Socrates death in such a way that also prevents Xanthippe’s becoming a 
widow. Suppose, for example, that Crito was to knock the hemlock from Socrates’ 
hand before it could be consumed.13 In this scenario, as a direct result of Crito’s 
13 While Crito’s knocking the hemlock from Socrates’ hand is itself a causal process, the dependency 
relation which it speaks to, holding between Socrates death and Xanthippe’s widowhood, is clearly non-
causal. The idea that causal processes can give rise to noncausal explanations is not novel. We discuss 
further instances of this surprising detail, related to constitutive explanation, in Sect. 4.
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intervention, Socrates would survive, so ‘C = 0’ (assuming all other variables are 
held fixed), what is more, as a direct result of Socrates’ survival, Xanthippe would 
not become widowed, so ‘E = 0’.
This interventionist analysis of Socrates and Xanthippe’s situation also allows 
us to cash out the sort of asymmetry which Kim highlights as a common factor in 
cases of both causal and noncausal dependence. In line with III above, it is precisely 
because any possible intervention upon Xanthippe’s widowhood must go through 
Socrates’ death, which suggests that the dependency here is asymmetric. Which is 
to say, Xanthippe’s widowhood is not exploitable for the purposes of manipulating 
Socrates’ death. And yet, for Kim, there are clear reasons for thinking that Socrates’ 
death and Xanthippe’s widowhood are not related as cause and effect in any ordi-
nary sense.
What this appears to suggest is that possible interventions cannot stand as a useful 
dividing line between causal and noncausal explanation. The possibility of interven-
ing simply does not carve nature at its causal joints. This conclusion will obviously 
come as a blow to I-puritans. Since, without possible interventions to play this role, 
it is not obvious how we are to distinguish these different types of explanation.14 
For those without such pre-theoretical commitments, however, I-liberalism ought to 
hold some intuitive appeal. Afterall, possible interventions stand as an addition to 
the metaphysical toolkit through which noncausal dependence can be analysed.
One area where our analysis has obvious application is the ongoing discus-
sion surrounding constitutive explanation: a popular hunting ground for I-puritans. 
In response to Craver’s (2007a, 2007b) attempts to define constitution in terms of 
symmetrical interventions, many have argued that this account fails on I-puritan 
grounds. Since interventions are assumed to designate causal relations, and causal 
relations alone, it is argued that Craver cannot make sense of the noncausal dynamic 
to a phenomenon’s being constituted by its spatiotemporal parts. Although, in the 
next section, we do the apparently impossible, and successfully apply the I-liberalist 
methodology described above to an example of constitutive explanation.
4  I‑Liberalism and Constitutive Explanation
Among philosophers of science, constitutive explanations are typically taken to be 
a form of mechanistic explanation, where a mechanism consists of entities/part/
objects and their activities/interactions/operations.15 Constitutive mechanistic expla-
nation is often distinguished from etiological mechanistic explanation. In the latter 
case, some mechanism explains a phenomenon for which it is causally responsible, 
whereas in the former, a phenomenon is explained by the underlying mechanism 
which constitutes it.
14 See Wilson (2020) for a thorough survey of plausible means by which one might seek to classify 
causal and noncausal dependence.
15 See, e.g. Machamer et  al. (2000); Craver & Darden (2002); Craver (2007b); Illari & Williamson 
(2012); Glennan (2017).
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Take, for example, the nastic movement of Mimosa pudica.16 Nastic movements 
occur in plants and fungi as a response to environmental stimuli (thigmonasty), with 
Mimosa being the most heralded example due to the dramatic nature of the response. 
Such movement is constituted by a release of potassium ions in the plant’s pulvini 
cells, which lowers the cell’s turgor pressure (pressure exerted on the cell wall due 
to exosmosis) and, in turn, collapses the cell’s parenchyma tissue, constricting the 
vascular strand serving as a hinge (Esau, 1965).
This explanation allows us to identify the three parts of Mimosa that are involved 
in the phenomena of nastic movement (E*): the potassium ions in the pulvini cells 
(C*1), the turgor pressure of the pulvini cells (C*2), and the parenchyma tissue of 
the pulvini cells (C*3). As we saw in the previous section, in order to capture the 
noncausal dependence at play here, we ought to be able intervene upon the Mimo-
sa’s pulvini cells in such a way that will also affect the plant’s nastic movement, but 
not vice versa. And this is exactly what we see.
Variables:
C*n: Whether the parenchyma tissue of the Mimosa’s pulvini cells collapse.17





Just as with the case of Socrates and Xanthippe, the nastic movement of the 
Mimosa can be manipulated through an intervention upon its pulvini cells. For 
example, administering potassium channel blockers (such as peptides containing 
the integrin-binding sequence RGD [Arg-Gly-Asp] [Jaffe et  al., 2002]), restricts 
potassium ions in the pulvini cells from affecting the cell’s turgor pressure and, as 
such, prevents nastic movement from occurring; so here ‘C*n = 0’ and, as a result, 
‘E* = 0’.
This interventionist approach to constitutive explanation also allows us to cash 
out the sort of explanatory asymmetry which Kim highlights as a common factor in 
cases of both causal and noncausal dependence. Once again, in line with condition 
III, it is precisely because there is no possible intervention upon the Mimosa’s nastic 
16 Other examples of constitutive mechanistic explanation abound: Spatial memory (Bechtel 2008; 
Craver 2007b); action potential (Craver 2007b); the heart (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Glennan 2010; 
Craver & Darden 2013); cells synthesizing proteins (Craver and Darden 2013; Darden 2002; Machamer 
et  al. 2000); long-term potentiation at synapses of neurons (Craver & Darden 2001; Craver & Darden 
2013; Craver 2007b; Machamer et al., 2000).
17 Here, we have condensed C*1−C*3 into a single variable. The relationship between spatio-temporal 
parts of a constitutive mechanism is typically taken to be causal (i.e. release of potassium ions in the 
pulvini cells causes the cell’s turgor pressure to drop). However, our principal interest is in the noncausal 
relationship between the constitutive mechanism and the phenomenon to be explained, as such combin-
ing these variables allows us to maintain the noncausal character of the arrow in the structural equations. 
Presuming, for the sake of brevity, that under experimental conditions we can guarantee that the pulvini 
cells’ parenchyma tissue will collapse only when the release of potassium ions decreases the turgor pres-
sure within the cell, this ought to make no difference to our overall argument.
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movement that does not go through the Mimosa’s pulvini cells, which suggests that 
the dependence here is asymmetric. Which is to say, the thigmonsasty of the Mimosa 
is not exploitable for the purposes of manipulating its pulvini cells.
However, in his own interventionist account of constitutive explanation, Craver’s 
(2007a, 2007b) has suggested that it is in fact mutual manipulability that defines 
such noncausal mechanisms. Craver argues that while ‘one can change the explanan-
dum phenomenon by intervening to change a component [of a mechanism]’, one can 
also (contrary to our account) ‘manipulate the component by intervening to change 
the explanandum phenomenon’ (2007b:153). As such, Craver concludes that all 
constitutive dependency relationships are “bidirectional”.
Yet, Craver’s account is clearly problematic on two related fronts.18 First, as 
Romero (2015), Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016), and Krickel (2018) high-
light, and the example of Mimosa demonstrates, manipulations of the latter variant, 
whereby a component is manipulated via the explanandum phenomenon, are impos-
sible by Woodward’s (2003) definition of an intervention.19 Second, supposing 
such “top-down” interventions were possible, given that interventions are intended 
to characterise explanatory relations, this would suggest that constitution entails 
explanatory symmetry (Schindler, 2013). And, as Khalifa et al. note, ‘a surefire way 
to embarrass a theory of explanation is to show that it fails to respect the common-
sense idea that explanation is an asymmetric relation’ (2018:1).20
The I-liberal interpretation of such mechanisms presented above, can easily avoid 
both of these issues, preserving the explanatory asymmetry which forms the heart 
of Kim’s desire for a unifying account of causal and noncausal dependence while, at 
the same time, ruling out the sort of top-down intervention which Craver (problem-
atically) believes to be characteristic of constitutive explanation.21 There is a further 
18 For further criticisms, not discussed here, see Harinen (2014).
19 Romer (2015) and Baumgartner & Gebharter (2016) argue that such interventions are actually ‘fat-
handed’ rather than outright impossible. A fat-handed intervention is an intervention which violates 
“III.” in as much as it manipulates both the mechanistic components and the phenomena in question at 
the same time, effectively serving as a common cause of both. While Woodward’s (2003) definition of an 
intervention can, according to Romer (2015) and Baumgartner & Gebharter (2016) be altered to accom-
modate such a notion, Krickel (2018) has argued that this approach has severe limitations. In so far as 
our own position takes such interventions to be impossible, and thus beyond the scope of I-liberalism, we 
preserve more of the core of Woodward’s (2003) original definition, and as such, stay truer to the charac-
ter of his manipulationist account of explanation.
20 Given the obvious difficulties which is raises, one might well wonder why Craver introduces the 
notion of mutual manipulation at all. His motivation is principally to try and make sense of important 
“top down” research strategies within the life sciences, distinguishing between interference experiments, 
stimulation experiments and activation experiments (2007b: 146–157). However, Baumgartner and Geb-
harter have recently argued that ‘[e]mpirical evidence does not only consist in correlational evidence 
resulting from suitable manipulations’ and, furthermore, that top-down experimentation can be made 
sense of without the need for top-down interventions.
21 The question of what distinguishes constitutive explanation from both other forms of noncausal 
dependence, and causal dependence, is an interesting one. Unfortunately, we do not have the space here 
to discuss this topic at length. However, we would point out that there are obvious features of consti-
tutive explanation which could serve as useful distinguishing characteristics, e.g. a mechanism and the 
phenomena which it explains are typically taken to share the same spatio-temporal location, which dis-
tinguishes such cases from noncausal explanations like Kim’s example of Socrates death and Xanthip-
1 3
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case…
apparent issue with Craver’s account, however, which is of much greater interest to 
us. In ‘Three Problems for the Mutual Manipulability Account of Constitutive Rel-
evance in Mechanisms’ Leuridan (2012) suggests that Craver’s account entails that 
constitutive explanations are, in fact, causal explanations.
Leuridan’s (2012) argument is that one cannot get away with embedding an 
account of constitutive explanation within an interventionist framework and emerge 
with a characterisation of noncausal explanation: interventions, in other words, 
highlight only causal relations. Indeed, Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016) agree, 
noting the following slogan from Woodward: ‘no causal difference without a dif-
ference in manipulability relations, and no difference in manipulability relations 
without a causal difference’ (2003:61). This slogan is, of course, the central tenet of 
I-puritanism.
The literature surrounding constitutive explanation is not the only area where we 
find support for I-puritanism. Another topic which has elicited a great deal discus-
sion surrounding the essentially causal character of interventions is the broader pro-
ject of providing a monistic account of explanation: ‘an analysis that accommodates 
causal and noncausal explanations, and accounts for the asymmetries of both’ (Khal-
ifa et al, 2018). Here too, Woodward’s (2003) interventionism has taken centre stage 
(e.g. Reutlinger, 2016, 2017, 2018).
Debate surrounding explanatory monism, and debate surrounding mechanistic 
explanation are closely connected. For example, a successful account of explanatory 
monism would, presumably, apply to mechanisms (both constitutive and etiological) 
as a limiting case.22 It is no surprise, then, to find that both debates have motivated 
their commitment to I-puritanism along very similar lines. The principal motiva-
tion for the essentially causal character of dependencies characterized by interven-
tions, is that Woodward (2003) himself assumes such an I-puritan stance. In the 
next section, however, after discussing explanatory monism in more detail, we argue 
that, although Woodward (2003) does support I-puritanism, this conclusion is not 
entailed by his analysis of causal explanation.
5  Woodward’s I‑Puritanism
An almost universal feature of recent attempts to provide a monistic account of 
explanation has been the abandoning of structural equation models and interven-
tionist counterfactuals with respect to noncausal explanation.23 Indeed, this appears 
to be a rare point of agreement, even among those who take the monist framework 
to be something other than counterfactual (e.g. Khalifa et al., 2018), and those who 
22 Although, this is not to say that the existence of noncausal mechanistic explanation is committal with 
respect to monism.
23 E.g. Saatsi and Pexton (2013); Jansson (2015); Reutlinger (2016, 2017); French and Saatsi (2018); 
Lange (2019); Khalifa et al (2020).
pe’s widowhood, which are not so constrained (See: Leuridan 2012; Romer 2015; Craver 2007b; Baum-




advocate explanatory pluralism (e.g. Lange, 2019). To take a popular example, 
Reutlinger (2017) proposes the following non-interventionist counterfactual criteria 
for a monistic explanation, where ‘G1,…,  Gm’ comprise generalizations, and ‘S1,…, 
 Sn’ comprise auxiliary statements:
 I.  Veridicality condition: G1, …, Gm, S1, …, Sn, and E are (approximately) 
true.
 II. Implication condition: G1, …, Gm and S1, …, Sn logically entail E or a con-
ditional probability P(E|S1, …, Sn) – where the conditional probability need 
not be ‘high’ in contrast to Hempel’s covering-law account.
 III.  Dependency condition: G1, …, Gm support at least one counterfactual of the 
form: had S1, …, Sn been different than they actually are (in at least one way 
deemed possible in the light of the generalizations), then E or the conditional 
probability of E would have been different as well.
And yet, as Roski (2020) highlights, in stripping Woodward’s (2003) account 
of the mechanism which characterizes causal asymmetry, namely interventions, 
Reutlinger’s account appears to suffer from the same embarrassing explanatory sym-
metry which plagues Craver’s (2007a, 2007b) account of constitutive mechanistic 
explanation. Reutlinger is not alone along monists here.24 As Lange similarly argues 
with respect to many other recent attempts to characterize explanatory monism:
‘These attempts recognize that even when there is explanatory asymmetry, 
there may be symmetry in counterfactual dependence. Therefore, something 
more than mere counterfactual dependence is needed to account for explana-
tory asymmetry’ (2019: 1).
In light of the predicament in which symmetry places monist accounts of expla-
nation, it would seem natural to expect to find some convincing reasons for reject-
ing the story which was told in the first half of this paper; that interventions stand 
to characterize certain explanatory asymmetries across both causal and noncausal 
instances. Strangely, however, there is very little in the way of argument put forward 
in defence of this stance.
The principal motivation for this position appeals to Woodward’s (2003) claim 
that possible interventions serve to illuminate exclusively causal dependencies. This 
intuition is frequently deployed within the recent literature. As Lange himself sug-
gests that ‘the notion of an intervention is a causal notion and so is not obviously 
applicable to non-causal explanation’ (2019: 2).25 Jansson also argues that interven-
tions cannot help in characterising the asymmetry of noncausal explanation, since 
24 We used this analysis as an example because Reutlinger’s (2016, 2017, 2018) account stands as an 
exception to the rule that ‘precise formulations of [explanatory monism] are few and far between’ (Khal-
ifa et al, 2018: 2).
25 It is important to note, however, that Lange does not support explanatory monism. Rather he suggests 
that ‘the order of explanatory priority is fixed by different considerations in different non-causal explana-
tions’ (2019: 24).
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‘the solution is given in terms of interventions, [and] these are cashed out in causal 
terms in Woodward [2003]’ (2015: 22, fn. 48). Similarly, Saatsi and Pexton argue 
that although Woodward ‘happily welcomes the possibility that the counterfactual 
aspect of his account may come apart from its causal aspect’, this element of Wood-
ward’s account ‘should not be wedded to a causal manipulationist interpretation of 
explanatory modal information’ (2013: 614).26
However, while Woodward’s (2003) does indeed support such an I-puritan read-
ing of his interventionist framework, an I-liberal interpretation is by no means ruled 
out. In summarizing the interventionist mantra, he suggests that any successful 
explanation ought to be accompanied by ‘a hypothetical or counterfactual experi-
ment that shows us that and how manipulation of the factors mentioned in the expla-
nation… would be a way of manipulating or altering the phenomenon explained’ 
(Woodward, 2003: 11). What the discussion of Kim’s example from the previous 
section suggests, we have maintained, is that causal relationships do not exhaus-
tively describe the ways in which the world might be manipulated or altered.
Woodward (2003) holds that what distinguishes explanatory counterfactuals from 
non-explanatory counterfactuals (which highlight mere correlations) is that only 
the former allow for the possibility of manipulation. This is not to say, of course, 
that all interventionist counterfactuals pick out causal relations per se, but instead, 
that no interventionist counterfactuals pick out relations of mere correlation.27 This 
understanding of interventions is perfectly compatible with the idea that some inter-
ventionist counterfactuals highlight possible manipulations which are not distinctly 
causal in nature.
The idea that interventions might stand as a useful distinguishing factor between 
causal and noncausal explanations can also be traced to Woodward (2003: 220–221). 
While both causal and noncausal patterns of dependence ought to be able to support 
counterfactuals (which in turn support “what-if-things-had-been-different” ques-
tions), in the latter case, according to Woodward, these counterfactuals cannot be 
interpreted in terms of interventions. It is important to note that this conclusion is 
reached on the basis of a single example: the dependence of the stability of plan-
etary orbits on the dimensionality of space–time. Woodward argues that ‘it seems 
implausible to interpret such derivations as telling us what will happen under inter-
ventions on the dimensionality of space–time’ (2003: 220).
26 As Woodward himself highlights, ‘Woodward (2003) (tacitly and without explicit discussion) adopted 
the common philosophical view that causal (and causal explanatory) relationships contrast with relation-
ships of dependence that hold for purely conceptual, logical, or mathematical reasons’ (2018: 121).
27 While, as Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016) point out, Woodward (2003: 61) suggests that there can 
be ‘no difference in manipulability relations without a causal difference’ this claim is not entailed by the 




The exact reason for this implausibility is not mentioned, although the most obvi-
ous candidate is that such an intervention is nomologically impossible.28 However, 
Woodward (2003) does not consider any interventions of the type discussed in the 
previous sections. There is nothing nomologically impossible, for example, about 
the prospect of intervening upon the Mimosa’s pulvini cells in order to elicit thig-
monasty. And, as we saw in Sect. 2, intervening upon Socrates’ death for the pur-
poses of manipulating Xanthippe’s widowhood is, not only possible, but provides 
an accurate characterization of the explanatory asymmetry which interests Kim 
(1974:1993).
Given the frequency with which Woodward (2003) is appealed to in defence of 
I-puritanism, there a quiet irony in his having recently weakened his own commit-
ment to this stance. In ‘Some Varieties of Non-Causal Explanation’, Woodward 
briefly discusses cases of noncausal explanations where ‘at least some of the vari-
able figuring in the candidate explanans are possible targets for manipulation… but 
the connection between these and candidate explanandum seems (in some sense) 
purely mathematical’ (2018: 130).
However, as Reutlinger et al. explain, ‘[i]n the mathematical case, this involves 
supposing that mathematical facts were different. But on the standard philosophical 
accounts of mathematics, mathematical truths are necessary’, as such intervening in 
such cases ‘would seem to be deeply problematic’ (2020: 10). Lange (2019) explic-
itly references the example used by Woodward (2018) (the traversibility of Königs-
berg’s famous bridges), as requiring interventions which are impossible to perform. 
This is not to say that there have not been attempts to make sense of the explanatory 
potential of such impossible interventions, but such accounts are strictly speaking 
beyond the scope of this paper.29
Despite this, there are reasons to think that Woodward (2018) would be sympa-
thetic to the central aim of this paper: providing the first robust defence of the claim 
that there are distinctively noncausal explanations which can be characterized in 
terms of possible interventions. Woodward does now consider interventions of the 
type discussed in the previous sections: ‘there is an obvious sense in which it is true 
that by manipulating whether or not Socrates dies, one can alter whether Xantippe is 
a widow’ (2018: 121). Further suggesting that such explanations are more naturally 
described by locutions such as “brings about by” than “causes” (2018: 131). While 
Woodward does not provide a great deal of detail concerning how he expects such 
interventions to fit within his earlier interventionist framework, we can see little rea-
son for him to reject the methodology laid out in this paper.
More recently still, Khalifa et  al (2020) refer to a position very close to our 
I-liberalism, by the (none-too-pithy) title quasi-interventionist change-relating 
29 See e.g., Baron et al (2017); Baron et al (2020); Reutlinger et al (2020); Baron & Colyvan (2021); and 
Baron (forthcoming). We discuss how impossible interventions fit into the landscape of stances on the 
nature of the distinction between causal and noncausal explanation in more detail in Sect. 7.
28 Interestingly, elsewhere Woodward seems to have little issue with the notion of impossible interven-
tions. He argues, for example, that ‘[e]ven in purely theoretical contexts, causal claims should be under-
stood as telling us about the results of hypothetical manipulations; it is just that we cannot, at least at 
present, carry out these manipulations’ (2003: 37).
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counterfactual monism (QCM). They note that the only revision to Woodward’s 
original characterization of an intervention which is required here, is replacing I 
with something like ‘X counterfactually depends on I’ (Khalifa et  al, 2020: 6).30 
This interpretation seems to capture the spirit of “R” and Kim’s desire to subsume 
‘as special cases the causal relation and other dependency relations’ (1974/1993: 
27). As Khalifa et al. suggest, ‘if this quasi-interventionist approach captured every 
kind of explanation, causes would just be a limiting case’ (2020: 6).31
Interestingly, however, Khalifa et al (2020) introduce QCM in the process of argu-
ing that an account of explanatory monism based upon it is untenable, because such 
methodology is incapable of dealing with a familiar type of noncausal explanation: 
constitutive explanation. The principal motivation for this stance being that possible 
interventions are apparently incapably of distinguish between constitutive explana-
tions and spurious correlations resulting from common explanatory dependence.
While a defence of monism itself is beyond the scope of this paper, in Sect. 4, 
we argued that a benefit of our own position is that it can account for the explana-
tory asymmetry of constitutive explanation. As such, in the next section, we demon-
strate that I-liberalism is perfectly capable of drawing a distinction between genuine 
noncausal constitutive dependence and spurious correlations arising as a result of a 
common explanatory source.
6  Noncausal Interventions and Common Explanatory Dependencies
Khalifa et al (2020) argue, citing Ylikoski (2013), that while ‘causal relata are meta-
physically independent entities, constitutive relata ‘are not independent existences, 
so one cannot think of an intervention on the basis that would not also be an inter-
vention on the system’ [2013: 284]’ (2019: 7). As a result, they suggest that an inter-
vention upon a system’s components or organization (the explanans), would also 
be a direct intervention upon the explanandum. Consequently, according to Khalifa 
et  al (2020), an intervention in this case would violate Woodward’s principle that 
‘[a]ny directed path from I to Y goes through X’ (2003: 93). This is because such an 
intervention would apparently act as a “common cause” of both X and Y.
If true, this would indeed be a troubling result. Difficulties in distinguishing 
instances where variables are spuriously correlated, owing to a common explanatory 
dependency, have historically plagued theories of explanation. Indeed, it is a prin-
cipal motivation for the adoption of interventionist methodology that, where A and 
30 It is worth noting that this revision is a much less dramatic one, than that proposed by Romero (2015) 
and Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016) in order to accommodate fat-handed interventions.
31 It is not clear to us that replacing the claim that ‘I causes X’ with the claim that ‘I counterfactually 
depends on X’ is at all necessary for I-liberalism. As we mentioned in footnote 12, we are perfectly 
happy with the relationship between I and X being a causal one. In the case of Socrates’ death and Xan-
thippe’s widowhood, any intervention upon Socrates’ death will be a causal process. What is important 
for I-liberalism, is that such an intervention establishes a subsequent noncausal explanatory dependence 
between the death of Socrates and Xanthippe’s becoming a widow. In this sense, I-liberalism appears to 
require even less modification to Woodward’s original manipulationist framework than QCM.
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B are correlated, it allows for the distinction to be reliably drawn between scenarios 
where: A causes B; B causes A:or A and B are both caused by C.32
While analogous spurious correlations do arise with respect to noncausal depend-
ence, it is clear to us that instances of constitutive explanation are not among them. 
If Khalifa et al. were correct in their claim that an interventionist account of non-
causal explanation will misdiagnose instances of constitutive explanation as spu-
rious correlation, then the I-liberalist would not to be able to draw a distinction 
between these cases. As we shall now demonstrate, however, our analysis is per-
fectly capable of distinguishing between spurious (noncausal) correlations and con-
stitutive explanations.
As an example of a genuinely spurious noncausal correlation, take the relation-
ship between Xanthippe’s widowhood, and the existence of Socrates’ Singleton. It 
seems that there is a necessary inverse correlation here, there are no possible worlds 
in which Xanthippe is a widow and Singleton Socrates exists. Similarly, there are no 
possible worlds in which Singleton Socrates does not exist and Xanthippe is not a 
widow. Yet, we would not want to say that Xanthippe’s widowhood depends upon, 
or is explained by, the nonexistence of Singleton Socrates (or vice versa).
Indeed, the correct story here seems rather obvious: the existence of Socrates’ 
Singleton and Xanthippe’s widowhood are both determined by a single common 
factor: the existence of Socrates. Where Socrates exists, it is necessarily the case 
that Single Socrates exists and that Xanthippe is not a widow (and vice versa). And, 
while Socrates’ existence explains both Singleton Socrates’ existence and Xan-
thippe’s not being widowed, neither of the latter facts explain each other. This case, 
then, looks like an instance of genuine noncausal common dependence of the type 
which Khalifa et al (2020) intend to highlight.
That the correlation between the existence of Singleton Socrates and Xanthippe’s 
widowhood is spurious can be quite happily cashed out in terms of interventions. In 
line with III, try as one might, it is simply not possible to intervene upon either Xan-
thippe’s widowhood, or the existence of Singleton Socrates, in order to manipulate 
the other; any such intervention must go through Socrates’ existence. This tells us 
that it is Socrates’ existence which is doing all of the determining here, and hence, 
32 Ylikoski’s (2013) argument is specifically aimed at Craver’s (2007a; 2007b) mutual manipulability 
account of constitutive explanations. In this context, the argument that constitutive explanation underde-
termines explanatory relations in virtue of being unable to distinguish such cases from spurious correla-
tions arising from common causes is, as far as we are concerned, perfectly sound. As we highlighted in 
footnote 16, the type of “top-down” interventions which result from Craver’s mutual manipulability, can 
be interpreted in such a way that they do appear to be the result of common causes. However, Khalifa 
et  al (2020) take this argument further, seemingly arguing that even the sort of “bottom up” interven-
tion which we have taken to be unproblematic gives rise to this same explanatory confusion. Woodward 
(2018) has also suggested (although in vaguer terms) that in abandoning interventions, explanatory mon-
ists face something like this problem. However, as we shall see below, by adopting I-liberalism, this 
result can be avoided.
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all of the explanatory work.33 For the sake of simplicity, let’s consider another (more 
basic) example of constitutive explanation:
Variables:
C: Whether the diamond’s constituent carbon atoms are thus-and-so arranged.





We can now see that this case of constitutive explanation is quite different to the 
spurious correlation highlighted above, and that this difference can be drawn out in 
terms of possible interventions. If Khalifa et al. (2020) are correct, and the arrange-
ment of the diamond’s constituent carbon atoms, and its hardness, are wrongly char-
acterised by I-liberalism as being jointly depend upon some common factor, it ought 
to be the case that there are no possible interventions upon either variable that goes 
through the other.
This line of thought mirrors Kim’s, in considering Socrates’ death and Xanthip-
pe’s widowhood as common effects of Socrates’ having ingested hemlock. In this 
case, Kim suggests that the problem with this idea is that the only route from hem-
lock to widowhood seems to go through death. In the case of Xanthippe’s widow-
hood and the existence of Singleton Socrates, on the other hand, any possible inter-
vention which attempts to manipulate the former using the latter, is mediated by the 
existence of Socrates. If Khalifa et al. (2020) are correct, then cases of constitutive 
explanation ought to look more like the relationship between Xanthippe’s widow-
hood and the existence of Singleton Socrates, that the relationship between Xan-
thippe’s widowhood and Socrates’ death. However, this is not what we find.
Just as in the case of Socrates’ death and Xanthippe’s widowhood, in line with 
III, any possible intervention upon the hardness of a cut diamond must go through 
its constituent carbon atoms.34 It is simply impossible to alter the hardness of a dia-
mond without altering the arrangement of its constituent carbon atoms. This is just 
what we saw in relation to the Mimosa’s in Sect. 4, any intervention upon the plant’s 
nastic movement must go through its pulvini cells. Were these cases of constitu-
tive explanation the result of a common explanatory source, there would be some 
third variable doing the actual explanatory work. But this is not so. Thus, an account 
of noncausal explanation which makes use of interventions can, in fact, draw an 
33 In ‘Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept’ (1990/1993) Kim uses a very similar argument to 
defend the thesis that supervenience, like correlation, is not an explanatory relation. Just as correlation 
is insufficient to establish an explanatory causal dependence relationship between two variables, Kim 
argues that supervenience is insufficient to establish an explanatory noncausal dependence relationship 
between two variables. The analogy between supervenience and correlation could well be an illuminat-
ing one, especially given a recent resurgence of interest in the explanatory status of supervenience (e.g. 
Kovacs 2019). Unfortunately, however, we do not have the space to explore this connection here.
34 Such an intervention could be performed by subjecting our diamond to around 10 million times ordi-
nary atmospheric pressure, for example (see e.g. Knudson et al., 2008).
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illuminating distinction between constitutive explanation and spuriously correlated 
variables resulting from a common explanatory dependence relation.
7  Concluding Remarks on Taxonomy
In this paper, we have attempted to mount the first sustained defence of I-liberalism, 
against its more popular rival, I-puritanism. In Sect. 2, we introduced Kim’s argu-
ment against causal imperialism, the claim that all explanation is essentially causal 
in nature. Causal imperialism is false, according to Kim, because there are clear 
cases of asymmetric explanatory counterfactual conditionals which are not the result 
of causal relationships. Crucially, what these causal and noncausal counterfactu-
als share, is a close connection to the notion of “bringing about”: where A depends 
upon B, we can bring about A by first bringing about B.
In Sect. 3, we introduced Woodward’s interventionist analysis of causal explana-
tion and argued that Kim’s intuition regarding the asymmetry of noncausal expla-
nation and the “bringing about” relation can be neatly characterized in terms of 
interventionist counterfactuals and structural equation models. What this shows, we 
argued, is that the notion of a possible intervention does not line up with the distinc-
tion between causal and noncausal explanation.
Having characterized the core claim of I-liberalism, that possible interventions 
can characterize certain noncausal explanations, in Sect. 4, we moved on to apply 
our methodology to an archetypal instance of such explanation: a constitutive 
mechanism. We argued that I-liberalism avoids two central issues facing Craver’s 
own mutual manipulability analysis: the need for impossible interventions; and the 
‘embarrassing’ explanatory symmetry which results. We also observed that debate 
surrounding constitutive explanation has been a key breeding ground of I-puritan 
sentiments, with the likes of Leuridan (2012) having dismissed Craver’s account 
tout court because it attempts to characterise noncausal explanation in terms of 
interventions.
As we also highlighted, however, this is not the only area where we find such 
dismissive attitudes. More recently still, debate surrounding the viability of explana-
tory monism has invoked similar responses. In Sect. 5, we noted that the predomi-
nating I-puritan stance has led to difficulty in characterising the obvious asymme-
try of noncausal explanation. Despite this difficulty, we showed that motivation for 
I-puritanism among those involved in characterizing both monistic and constitutive 
explanation typically appeals to Woodward’s (2003) own defence of this position. 
In response, we argued that, even though Woodward (2003) supports I-puritanism, 
nothing in his account mandates this interpretation. Indeed, Woodward’s (2018) 
most recent foray into the topic of noncausal explanation appears to roll back this 
stance and take a significant step towards I-liberalism.
In Sect. 6, we discussed an argument, recently put forward by Khalifa et al (2020), 
which suggests that an interventionist account of noncausal explanation would be 
unable to distinguish between genuinely explanatory relationships and spurious cor-
relations resulting from common causes. On the contrary, we argued the I-liberalist 
is perfectly capable of drawing a distinction between genuine explanatory noncausal 
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dependence relations on the one hand, and unexplanatory spurious correlations aris-
ing from a common dependence relation, on the other. In what remains of this final 
section, we wish to provide something of a taxonomy of the various positions which 
have been discussed in this paper and highlight exactly what our own position com-
mits us to.
While the idea that all explanation is causal explanation has largely fallen out of 
favour, it is worth noting that causal imperialism is fully compatible with I-puri-
tanism as we have described it. One might think (against the current consensus, of 
course) that all explanation is causal explanation and that all such explanation can 
be characterized in interventionist terms. Let’s call this position “strong causal puri-
tanism”. Causal imperialists need not necessarily think that all causal explanation is 
characterizable in interventionist terms, just that wherever one can intervene upon 
X with respect to Y in such a way that changes the value of Y, X causes Y. This 
leaves open the possibility that, while all explanations are causal explanations, some 
such explanations defy interventionist analysis. Let’s call this position “weak causal 
puritanism”.
The former of these positions, strong causal puritanism, implies explanatory 
monism. If all explanation is causal explanation, and all causal explanation is char-
acterizable in terms of interventions, then we have a single unifying (intervention-
ist) account of explanation. Conversely, the latter position, weak causal puritanism, 
implies explanatory pluralism. Even if all explanation is causal in nature, if some 
such explanations are not characterizable in interventionist terms, then explanatory 
monism must be false. As far as we are aware, however, no one has committed them-
selves to either of these positions in the recent literature.
Those of an I-puritan persuasion are likely to reject causal imperialism on the 
grounds that noncausal explanations are possible. Monist I-puritans will argue that 
although causal and noncausal explanation can be captured using a single unifying 
thesis, said thesis will not reference interventions.35 Pluralist I-puritans, on the other 
hand, will accept that noncausal explanation is possible, but reject the idea that both 
types of explanation can be captured in a single unifying thesis, as Lange puts it: 
‘the order of explanatory priority is fixed by different considerations in different 
non-causal explanations’ (2019: 24).
I-liberalism is obviously incompatible with causal imperialism on two fronts. 
First, I-liberalism presupposes that noncausal explanations are possible, and second, 
it argues (contra I-puritanism) that (at least) some noncausal explanations can be 
characterized in terms of the possibility of intervening upon the explanans variable. 
Given that causal imperialism consists in the denial the first of these claims, the sec-
ond is clearly a nonstarter. Although, as with causal imperialism and I-puritanism, 
I-liberalism is noncommittal with respect to explanatory monism vs explanatory 
pluralism.
35 As we have seen such theories typically take counterfactuals to be the central unifying feature of 
causal and noncausal explanation, although Khalifa et al (2018) have recently argued for a monistic infer-
ential account of explanation.
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A monist I-liberalist methodology would imply, not only that possible interven-
tions can characterize certain instances of noncausal explanation, but that possible 
interventions are capable of characterizing all instances of explanation. The most 
obvious reason for rejecting this hard-line I-liberalism, are scenarios of the sort 
highlighted by Woodward (2003) as a reason for rejecting I-liberalism all together. 
These involve counterfactual conditionals whose antecedents hold with necessity. 
Intervening upon a variable which holds its value of necessity (like the dimension-
ality of space–time) will, of course, be at least nomologically (although often also 
logically and/or metaphysically) impossible.
Such counterpossible counterfactuals have received a great deal of attention 
within the philosophy of science literature. Indeed, one of the most interesting 
recent developments has been the idea that we can cash out the explanatory poten-
tial of counterpossibles in terms of interventions, even though such interventions are 
impossible. For example, Baron et al (2017), Reutlinger et al (2020) and Baron et al 
(2020) have argued that mathematical explanations can be understood in terms of 
interventions which are, strictly speaking, (metaphysically) impossible to perform.36
It is important to note, however, that this position is compatible with I-puritan-
ism. Indeed, a pluralist I-puritan might well accept that certain noncausal explana-
tions are characterizable in terms of impossible interventions, but nonetheless main-
tain their central thesis, that wherever it is possible to intervene upon X in such a 
way that changes the value of Y, then X causes Y. In this sense, there would remain 
hope for the I-puritan that a neat dividing line can be drawn between causal and 
noncausal explanation in terms of possible/impossible interventions. It is this idea 
which we have sought to undermine.37
In this paper, we have attempted to mount a thorough defence of only a weak 
form of pluralist I-liberalism, which suggests that possible interventions do not 
highlight causal explanatory relations alone. In other words, our pluralist I-liberalist 
thesis suggest merely that some noncausal explanations, of the types highlighted 
herein, are characterizable in terms of interventions which are possible to perform. 
This weaker I-liberalist thesis is, of course, sufficient to prove the falsity of I-puri-
tanism. If even a single noncausal explanation permits of a manipulationist analysis, 
then it simply cannot be the case that possible interventions serve only to character-
ize causal relations.38
36 Schaffer (2016, 2017) and Wilson (2016, 2018) have argued that metaphysical explanations similarly 
require the analysis of impossible interventions, and Baron & Colyvan (2021) and Baron (forthcoming) 
have argued that certain ontological and logical explanations (respectively) are in the same boat. In all 
these cases, adopting such a stance requires a commitment to the non-triviality of counterpossibles and 
the abandoning of the traditional semantics for counterfactuals (see e.g., Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973). 
However, as Schaffer (2016) highlights, there are already good reasons for thinking that counterpossible 
scenarios require non-trivial evaluation (see, e.g. Restall 1997; Goodman 2004; Priest 2005; and Jago 
2015).
37 Our thanks go to an anonymous reviewer at this journal for pressing this important point.
38 Thanks to Alastair Wilson for invaluable guidance on previous incarnations of this paper; also, to two 
anonymous reviewers at this journal. This paper forms part of the project “A Framework for Metaphysi-
cal Explanation in Physics” (FraMEPhys), hosted by the University of Birmingham and funded through 
the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innova-
tion programme (grant agreement no. 757295).
1 3
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case…
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Audi, P. (2012). A clarification and defences of the notion of grounding. In F. Correia & B. Schneider 
(Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: understanding the structure of reality.  (pp. 101–121). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Baron, S. (forthcoming). Counterfactuals of ontological dependence. Journal of the American Philosoph-
ical Association, 1–22.
Baron, S., & Colyvan, M. (2021). Explanation impossible. Philosophical Studies, 178(2), 559–576.
Baron, S., Colyvan, M., & Ripley, D. (2017). How mathematics can make a difference. Philosopher’s 
Imprint, 17(3), 1–19.
Baron, S., Colyvan, M., & Ripley, D. (2020). A counterfactual approach to explanation in mathematics. 
Philosophia Mathematica, 28(1), 1–34.
Baumgartner, M., & Casini, L. (2017). An abductive theory of constitution. Philosophy of Science, 84(2), 
214–233.
Baumgartner, M., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Constitutive relevance, mutual manipulability, and fat-handed-
ness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 67(3), 731–756.
Bechtel, W. (2008). Mechanisms in cognitive psychology: What are the operations. Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 75(5), 983–994.
Bechtel, W., & Abrahamson, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441.
Bokulich, A. (2011). How scientific models can explain. Synthese, 180(1), 33–45.
Bokulich, A. (2018). Searching for noncausal explanations in a sea of causes. In A. Reutlinger & J. Saatsi 
(Eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations. 
(pp. 141–161). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Briggs, R. (2012). Interventionist counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 160(1), 139–166.
Cartwright, N. (1979). Causal laws and effective strategies. Noûs, 13(4), 419–437.
Collingwood, R. G. (1940). An essay on metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craver, C. (2007a). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Craver, C. (2007b). Constitutive explanatory relevance. Journal of Philosophical Research, 32, 3–20.
Craver, C. (2014). The ontic account of scientific explanation. In M. Kaiser, O. Scholz, D. Plenge, & A. 
Hüttemann (Eds.), Explanation in the special sciences: the case of biology and history.  (pp. 27–52). 
Berlin: Springer.
Craver, C., & Darden, L. (2001). Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory. 
In P. Machamer, R. Grush, & P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Theory and Method in Neuroscience.  (pp. 
112–137).  Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Craver, C., & Darden, L. (2002). Strategies in the interfiled discovery of the mechanism of protein syn-
thesis. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in the History and Philosophy 
of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 33(1), 1–28.
Craver, F., & Darden, L. (2013). Search of Mechanisms. Discoveries across the Life Sciences. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Darden, L. (2002). Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69(S3), 342–352.
Dasgupta, S. (2017). Constitutive explanation. Philosophical. Issues, 27(1), 74–97.
 N. Emmerson 
1 3
Esau, K. (1965). Plant anatomy. John Wiley.
French, S., & Saatsi, J. (2018). Symmetries and explanatory dependencies in physics. In A. Reutlinger & 
J. Saatsi (Eds.), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Expla-
nations.  (pp.185–205). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gasking, D. (1955). Causation and recipes. Mind, 64(256), 479–487.
Glennan, S. (2010). Mechanisms, causes, and the layered model of the world. Philosophy and Phenom-
enological Research, 81(2), 362–381.
Glennan, S. (2017). The new mechanical philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Goodman, J. (2004). An extended Lewis/Stalnaker semantics and the new problem of counterpossi-
bles. Philosophical Papers, 33(1), 35–66.
Harinen, T. (2014). Mutual manipulability and causal inbetweenness. Synthese, 195(1), 35–54.
Hausman, D. M. (1982). Causal and explanatory asymmetry. PSA: Proceedings of the biennial meet-
ing of the philosophy of science association (vol. 1982, pp. 43–54).
Hitchcock, C. (2001). The intransitivity of causation revealed in equations and graphs. Journal of 
Philosophy, 98(6), 273–299.
Illari, P., & Williamson, J. (2012). What is a Mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across sci-
ences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(1), 119–135.
Jaffe, J., Leopold, A., & Staples, R. (2002). Thigmo responses in plants and fungi. American Journal 
of Botany, 89, 375–382.
Jago, M. (2015). Hyperintensional propositions. Synthese, 192(3), 585–601.
Jansson, L., & Saatsi, J. (2019). Explanatory abstractness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 70(3), 817–844.
Khalifa, K., Doble, G., & Millson, J. (2020). Counterfactuals and explanatory pluralism. British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(4), 1439–1460.
Khalifa, K., Millson, J., & Risjord, M. (2018). Inference, explanation, and asymmetry. Synthese. 
https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s11229- 018- 1791-y
Kim, J. (1974/1993). Noncausal connections. In J. Kim (Ed.), Supervenience and mind. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kim, J. (1973). Causes and counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophy, 70(17), 570–572.
Kim, J. (1990). Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy, 21(1–2), 1–27.
Kim, J. (1994). Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence. Philosophical Issues, 5, 51–69.
Knudson, M., Desjarlais, D., & Dolan, D. (2008). Shock-wave exploration of the high-pressure phases 
of carbon. Science, 322(5909), 1822–1825.
Kovacs, D. (2017). Grounding and the argument from explanatoriness. Philosophical Studies, 
174(12), 2927–2952.
Kovacs, D. (2019). The myth of the myth of supervenience. Philosophical Studies, 176(8), 
1967–1989.
Krickel, B. (2018). Saving the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance. Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Science Part A, 68, 58–67.
Lange, M. (2019). Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts of non-causal explanation. 
Synthese. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s11229- 019- 02317-3
Leuridan, B. (2012). Three problems for the mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance 
in mechanisms. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63(2), 399–427.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of words. Wiley-Blackwell.
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 
67(1), 1–25.
Meek, C., & Glymour, C. (1994). Conditioning and interventing. British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 45(4), 1001–1021.
Menzies, P., & Price, H. (1993). Causation as a secondary quality. British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 44(2), 187–203.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, reasoning and inference. Cambridge University Press.
Pearl, J. (2009). Causal inference in statistics: An overview. Statistical Surveys, 3, 96–146.
Peirce, C. S. (1900). In E. Moore (Ed.), The writings of Charles S. Peirce: A chronological edition. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Peirce, C. S. (1931–58). In C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss (Eds.), Collected papers of charles sanders pei-
rce. (vols. i-vi), A. Burks (vols. vii & viii). Cambridge MA: Belknap Press.
Pexton, M. (2014). How dimensional analysis can explain. Synthese, 191(10), 2333–2351.
1 3
A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case…
Potochnik, A. (2017). Idealization and the aims of science. University of Chicago Press.
Railton, P. (1981). Probability, explanation, and information. Synthese, 48(2), 233–256.
Restall, G. (1997). Ways things can’t be. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38(4), 583–596.
Reutlinger, A. (2016). Is there a monist theory of causal and non-causal explanations? The counter-
factual theory of scientific explanation. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 733–745.
Reutlinger, A. (2017). Does the counterfactual theory of explanation apply to non-causal explanation 
in metaphysics? European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 7, 1–18.
Reutlinger, A. (2018). Extending the counterfactual theory of explanation. In A. Reutlinger & J. Saatsi 
(Eds.), Explanation beyond causation: philosophical perspectives on non-causal explanations. . 
(pp. 74–95). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reutlinger, A., Colyvan, M., & Krzyżanowska, K. (2020). The prospects for a monist theory of non-causal 
explanation in science and mathematics. Erkenntnis. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s10670- 020- 00273-w
Rice, C. (2015). Moving beyond causes: Optimality models and scientific explanation. Noûs, 49(3), 
589–615.
Romer, F. (2015). Why there isn’t inter-level causation in mechanisms. Synthese, 192(11), 3731–3755.
Roski, S. (2020). Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation. Philosophical 
Studies. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s11098- 020- 01518-8
Ruben, D. (1990). Explaining explanation. Routledge.
Saatsi, J. (2018). On explanations from geometry of motion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Sci-
ence, 69(1), 253–273.
Saatsi, J., & Pexton, M. (2013). Reassessing Woodward’s account of explanation: Regularities, counter-
factuals, and noncausal explanations. Philosophy of Science, 80(5), 613–623.
Schaffer, J. (2016). Grounding in the image of causation. Philosophical Studies, 173(1), 49–100.
Schindler, S. (2013). Mechanistic explanation: asymmetry lost. In K. Dieks (Ed.), Recents Progress in 
Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems. Berlin: Springer.
Skow, B. (2014). Are there non-causal explanations (of Particular Events)? British Journal for the Phi-
losophy of Science, 63(3), 445–467.
Stalnaker, R. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American 
Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). . (pp. 98–112). Oxford: Blackwell.
Strevens, M. (2008). Depth: An account of scientific explanation. Harvard University Press.
Taylor, E. (2018). Against explanatory realism. Philosophical Studies, 175(1), 197–219.
Thompson, N. (2018). Irrealism about grounding. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82, 23–44.
von Wright, G. H. (1975). Causality and Determinism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Wilson, A. (2021). Counterpossible reasoning in physics. Philosophy of Science, 88(5).
Wilson, A. (2018). Metaphysical causation. Noûs, 50(4), 1–29.
Wilson, A. (2020). Classifying dependencies. In D. Glick, G. Darby, & A. Marmodoro (Eds.), The foun-
dation of reality: Fundamentality, space and time.  (pp.46–59). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: A theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2015). Interventionism and causal exclusion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
91(2), 303–347.
Woodward, J. (2018). Some varieties of non-causal explanation. In A. Reutlinger & J. Saatsi (Eds.), 
Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations.  (pp.117–
141). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ylikoski, P. (2013). Causal and constitutive explanation compared. Erkenntnis, 78(2), 277–297.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
